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**REGIONAL FOOD SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME
(REFORM)**

SYNTHESIS REPORT

**Inventory on Policy Measures for Food Security
and Prioritisation in the IGAD Region**

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Summary and conclusions

Various aspects of food security policy have recently come under reappraisal and renewal among IGAD's member states. The factors involved in food security are many and varied, and there are numerous ways to understand the term. But the main policies required for it lie in these areas:

- agriculture;
- agricultural trade;
- poverty and social protection;
- mechanisms to address both chronic and transitory food insecurity when it arises;
- the management of disasters and risks of disaster.

The present reappraisal was brought into focus by the food price crisis of 2007-08, but it started before then. For example, a far-reaching new Food Security Programme began in Ethiopia in 2005, while the Sudan's Agricultural Revival Programme was based on recommendations that were published in 2006. Still earlier examples are the creation or reinvigoration of national food reserves in both the Sudan and Kenya in 2001.

The price crisis drew attention to the vulnerability of large numbers of poor people in the region, both as to prices and other changes in food supplies. Much of the region has suffered from three years of insufficient rainfall as well as a continuation of conflicts and the refugees and internal displacements that arise from them. In these circumstances, any idea in the international community that global markets would provide for food security was found seriously wanting. Likewise, there is a growing awareness that it does not help to treat chronic food insecurity with repeated deliveries of emergency food aid, as though it was merely a series of transitory difficulties. In the long run, these methods are only likely to make chronic problems worse.

Food security is a simple idea in principle, but diverse influences can lead to food insecurity. In the Horn of Africa region they include the following.

- The risky nature of food production and distribution in general. Much of the region is arid or semi-arid, and everywhere the climate and rain patterns are unreliable. Soil qualities vary, leaving many lowland areas suitable for pasture but not for agriculture.
- Pervasive poverty throughout the region. In every country there is a large proportion of vulnerable people, who face difficulty in growing or earning enough to feed their households. This makes them vulnerable to any destabilisation of food supplies, whatever its origin.
- Poor systems of communication around the region, which inhibit both domestic and cross-border trade.
- The adverse consequences of climate change, which appears to be responsible for a greater variability of rainfall, more frequent droughts and a lowering of the water table in much of the region.
- Rapid population growth, which puts pressure both on the resources available in rural areas and the food supplies reaching urban areas.
- Conflicts. Some of these are unresolved, others were resolved long ago but still have after-effects with refugees and internally displaced people, and others lie between these two categories.

The policy reappraisals going on in the region fall into several categories. The most prominent are:

- A rethinking of agricultural policies. As already noted, this occurred in the Sudan between 2006 and 2008. In Kenya it has been under way since about 2008 and is already leading to some conclusions. Reassessments are also occurring in Uganda and in the transitional government of Somalia.
- A rethinking of social protection, often to put it on a more comprehensive basis as well as to link it more closely with the needs of food security. This has been under way in Ethiopia since 2005, and new plans are being laid in Kenya and Uganda.
- New arrangements to help needy households to achieve food security, notably in Ethiopia's four-part Food Security Programme, in operation since 2005, and Djibouti's recently adopted food security plan. In Ethiopia more than anywhere, changes in policy arose from a recognition of the different needs of those facing chronic and transitory food insecurity, in particular a realisation that for chronic insecurity the long-term causes must be addressed rather than repeatedly offering emergency assistance.
- Disaster risk management is being sharpened up and made more forward-looking.
- There is a growing impetus towards regional cooperation, especially over cross-border trade, risk management and food reserves.

However, there are numerous opportunities for more to be done, in areas such as:

- Cross-border trade: improvements are needed in the roads and other infrastructure, border procedures and mutual tariffs. While individual countries can do much here, there is also a role for regional cooperation, especially through IGAD.
- The development of food reserves, for use both to address critical food shortages and to stabilise staple food prices throughout the region. Part of the need is to expand the reserves' local purchases of food, including indigenous staples. IGAD's commitment to establish a regional food reserve deserves encouragement and support.
- A reorientation of economic and social policies to make a serious attack on poverty and inequality. Food security depends on the access of all citizens to food as much as it does on food's availability.
- Conflict resolution. Uganda succeeded in ending a long period of profound conflict and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement has existed in the Southern Sudan for four years. The lessons of this experience need to be learnt and built on throughout the region.

Introduction¹

There is a long history of food insecurity in the Horn of Africa. Agriculture and livestock rearing face unusually high risks due to the unreliability of rains and aridity of the region, and the fragility of other factors such as the soils. The situation is now aggravated by climate change and the even more erratic appearance of rain in recent years. The sharp increases in world cereal prices in 2007-08 exacerbated the already critical food situation in the region.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1986 with a mandate to combat desertification and promote food security across the region. That mandate is reflected in IGAD's current Food Security Strategy, adopted in 2005. The region is perhaps the most food-insecure part of the world and it has a high profile in global discussions of food needs. It was therefore decided to establish an inventory of policy measures for food security among IGAD's member states, which can be used to inform their global partners at the UN Food & Agriculture Organisation (FAO)'s Food Security Summit in November 2009. This is the resulting report.

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Any errors or omissions in this report are entirely the author's responsibility.

¹ This report was commissioned by IGAD with the financial assistance of the European Union. However, its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be regarded as reflecting the position of either IGAD or the European Union.

2. Background of study

This study is based on a tour of five of IGAD's member states to gather information in September and October 2009, during which the consultant held meetings with representatives of the governments, donor organisations and other interested parties. The countries visited in turn were Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. The consultant did not go to Somalia due to the security situation there, nor did he visit Eritrea as the country has suspended its membership of IGAD.

The terms of reference of the study are in Appendix 1 on p. 44.

The factors involved in food security are many and varied, and there are almost as many ways to understand the term as there are food security analysts. In the past it was generally understood to arise largely from agricultural policy, but in situations of emergency food security is easily elided with the short-term need to make up for food shortages. The present understanding of the term owes much to the pioneering work on famines of the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Amartya Sen, who established that there is frequently plenty of food available at times of famine but a section of society does not have access to it. This is reflected in this widely quoted definition of food security at the FAO's World Food Summit in 1996:

'Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.'

Food security policy in the long term must ensure there is enough food available and that there is universal access to it, so as to end any need for emergency measures. Such measures are only designed to meet short-term emergency needs, not to be a semi-permanent part of any country's food supply. The need to meet people's food *preferences* must not be overlooked, even if there is a question how far it should be taken: would it for example include an individual's preference for venison, caviare and truffles over simpler and cheaper foods?

Food security policy is taken here to have three main elements, in this order of importance:

1. The regular production or assured supply of sufficient nutritious food at places and prices that are accessible to everybody and meet their preferences.
2. Assurance that all citizens have the means to acquire or grow the food they require for a nutritious diet, and sufficient economic robustness to withstand shocks of all sorts, whether they be naturally caused (e.g. a low harvest caused by pests or drought), economic (e.g. increases in food prices), personal (e.g. sudden expenditure needs, such as can arise from illness or bereavement), political (e.g. the interruption of supplies because of conflict) or from any other cause. This is a broad understanding of the concept of Social Protection as applied to food security.
3. Arrangements in place to foresee possible interruptions to food supply and to ensure that everybody is adequately fed in the event of such an emergency (Disaster Risk Management).

Linkages of the contents of this report to the *Sirte Declaration* and to the *Objectives and Possible Decisions of the 2009 World Summit on Food Security* can be found separately in *IGAD Region Food Security Policy Review - Supplementary Papers*.

3. Current food security situation in the IGAD region

The Horn of Africa is an inherently high-risk area for agriculture and livestock rearing, further aggravated in recent years by climate change and conflicts. There is chronic food insecurity and there are frequent transitory occurrences of food insecurity, some of which are now turning to chronic. After several years of drought many populations are losing their resilience to shocks. There are numerous reasons why the situation has deteriorated, including a rapidly growing population, climate change, soil degradation, a lowering of the water table, and falling natural yields in some places.

Overall the situation is very serious in the final quarter of 2009. However, the picture is complex in each country as well as across the region as a whole. The basic present situation in each country is set out below.

Djibouti:

Djibouti is the smallest country in the region and little of its land is cultivable. Most of the population lives in Djibouti city and the state relies on imports for most of its food. Much of this is imported from overseas but there is also a thriving trade with neighbouring Ethiopia, which supplies vegetables on formal markets and staple foods (mainly sorghum) through informal trade. Food security in these circumstances requires enough resources to pay for the imports, and the means in each household to buy food in the market place. However, despite the continuing development of the port of Djibouti there is a serious food and poverty situation. Unemployment in urban Djibouti is exceptionally high at 59 per cent, while acute malnutrition of children under five has been consistently above the 15 per cent critical threshold defined by the World Health Organisation. It was measured at 17.9 per cent in 2002, 20.7 per cent in 2006 and 16.8 per cent in 2007. After the recent increase in food prices it is likely to have increased again since then. The country acts as host to refugees from several places, and pastoralists displaced from other countries by drought.

In early 2009, 145,000 people in Djibouti, or 18 per cent of the population, were food-insecure, and only 97,000 (11 per cent) were fully food-secure, according to the World Food Programme.²

Eritrea:

As the consultant did not visit Eritrea, he did not find recent information on vulnerability or the number of food-insecure people in that country.

Ethiopia:

The fragility of Ethiopia's food supply has been well-known since the famines of 1973 and 1984-85. The country's topography is varied and the arid lowland areas, especially in the Rift Valley and the south-east, are better suited to pastoralism than agriculture. But the Highlands normally receive sufficient rain and a large part of them continues to produce agricultural surpluses, much of it the traditional staple cereal, teff. However, production is held back by a lack of technology and infrastructure, very small landholdings and rapid population growth. Soil erosion

² WFP (2009b), p. 25.

and increasingly erratic rains add to these pressures. This leads to widespread food insecurity, especially in arid and semi-arid areas, but not only there.

At present Ethiopia's main programme for the chronically food-insecure assists 7.5 million people (see the next chapter for details). Regarding transitory emergency needs, the government and humanitarian aid partners appealed to the international community for additional resources to meet the immediate food requirements of 6.2 million people. According to the updated Humanitarian Requirements Document launched on 22nd October 2009, a total of US\$175 million was required to meet both food and non-food needs from October to December 2009. The beneficiary number increased from 4.9 million in January 2009 to 6.2 million in October; this was mainly attributed to weather variability induced by climate change, which resulted in: poor performance of the 2009 *belg* rains (February-May); and late onset, erratic distribution and early cessation of the main rains (June-September) in some areas. The slow natural recovery of pastoral areas from the effects of below-normal rains in previous seasons is another factor which contributed to the higher needs. The mid-season *meher* assessment conducted in September-October 2009, however, projected a decreased number of beneficiaries for the first half of 2010 following the improvement of the overall situation across the country.

Kenya:

After assisting 3.6 million people in a drought in 2006, the WFP decided that emergency support would no longer be necessary in Kenya, but a long-term relief programme continued. However, that changed after post-election disturbances in 2007-08 led to internal displacements. In the present drought, 3.8 million people were estimated in October 2009 to be highly or extremely food-insecure, mainly in pastoral and marginal agricultural areas of the north and north-east. There has been much loss of cattle among pastoralists, many of whom have sought better pasture across the borders in Ethiopia and Somalia. A vulnerability assessment in 2008 also indicated serious problems of urban food insecurity, with 3.5 million to 4.1 million urban dwellers estimated to be below the dietary energy threshold of 2,100 kCal per day.

Somalia:

There is a very severe drought, especially in the centre of the country, after two-and-a-half years of less than normal rainfall. In 2008 food prices also increased by more than 300 per cent. According to the United Nations,

'Somalia faces its worse Humanitarian Crisis in eighteen years, with half of the population or an estimated 3.64 million people in need of emergency livelihood and life-saving assistance at least until December 2009. This signals a serious deterioration in the food security and nutrition situation from earlier this year. Most of the 3.64 million people in crisis ... are concentrated in south and central Somalia.'³

The food-insecure are estimated as: 655,000 urban, 1.44 million rural, and 1.5 million internally displaced people (nearly 1.3 million having been displaced in the last two years alone). Somalia was forecast to produce 260,000 tons and import 423,000 tons of cereals in 2009, with another 119,000 tons expected as food aid.

³ FSNAU (2009), p. 1.

The Sudan:

This year's rains have been better than in countries to the south-east of the Sudan, and in most parts of the country food security remains satisfactory. The country regularly makes large imports of wheat to feed Khartoum and other urban centres.

There is a complex long-term situation arising from conflicts and the after-effects of former conflicts. The most serious is in the western region of Darfur, where the WFP is assisting more than 4 million people. In the Southern Sudan 1.3 million are food-insecure as a result of escalating conflict and delayed harvests, while more than 40,000 refugees from Eritrea remain in the east of the country. In total, the WFP is providing food aid to about 6 million people, requiring 678,000 tons of food at a cost of US\$829 million in 2009.

Uganda:

According to specialists in Kampala the food situation has deteriorated, but it remains better than in most of the IGAD region. According to FEWSNET the country is generally food-secure except for the north-east and a large part of the north. The WFP is supplying 1.9 million people with food this year, including 1 million in the north-eastern region of Karamoja, where it has operated at periodic intervals since 1963. The other people assisted are refugees, internally displaced people, and returning IDPs in the north.

Despite the gravity of the situation in East Africa, the WFP reported in September that funding for international food aid is at its lowest point in 20 years. 'WFP's budget to feed 108 million people in 74 countries this year is US\$6.7 billion. But today, we have just US\$2.6 billion and our forecast is that we'll have US\$3.8 billion by year's end', it said.⁴

Over 40 per cent of the WFP's food aid goes to the IGAD region and its operations in the Sudan and Ethiopia are its biggest in the world. The U.S. is by far the biggest funder of both of them, generally providing aid 'in kind', rather than as cash to pay for food either in the recipient country or in third countries, as most other donors do. The U.S. has already provided 52 per cent of 2009 requirements for the Sudan, despite a 22 per cent overall shortfall in WFP receipts there; and 33 per cent of the requirements over three years for Ethiopia, which is more than half of the total contributed so far. The U.S. also supplied 56 per cent of the requirements for emergency assistance arising from drought and post-election violence in Kenya in 2008-09.⁵

⁴ www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EGUA-7W6NMX?OpenDocument&rc=1. (All but one of the internet references in this report were consulted in October 2009. The date of the exception is noted in the References.)

⁵ Data from the WFP's website, www.wfp.org/operations/list.

IGAD members at a glance

All data are for 2007

Source: World Bank unless otherwise indicated

	Population (millions)	Area (sq km)	Gross national income per capita (US\$)	Urban population (% of total)	Child malnutrition (% of children under 5)	Growth in GDP (%)	Growth in GDP per capita (%)	Agriculture's share in GDP (%)	Gini index ⁶
Djibouti	0.83	23,200	1,090	87	26	4.0	2.2	3.9	40.0
Ethiopia	73.9	1.1 million	220	17	35	11.8	8.4	46.3	29.8
Kenya	37.5	583,000	680	21	17	6.9	4.1	22.7	47.7
Somalia	8.7	637,000	--	36	33	--	--	--	--
The Sudan	38.6	2.5 million	950	43	--	10.2	7.7	28.3	--
Uganda	30.9	236,000	340	13	19	6.5	2.9	29.0	42.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	800	24.3 million	952	36	27	--	--	--	--

⁶ A measure of inequality in income or expenditure. The lower the number, the more equal the society. This measures Ethiopia as the most equal society outside Europe and Japan, and Kenya as one of the least equal outside Latin America. Source: UN Development Programme (*Human Development Report 2009*).

4. Key policy measures in food security per IGAD member state

This chapter describes some of the leading measures used in IGAD countries to ensure food security. In the space available it is not possible to provide a comprehensive list, and special importance is given to recent initiatives, especially those which break new ground in the region. This includes some which are still under discussion within a member state and not yet adopted as government policy. A country-by-country list follows.

DJIBOUTI

A new National Food Security Programme (NFSP)⁷ was adopted by the Council of Ministers in July 2009. The Programme has two components. The first one, called 'Prevention and Management of Circumstantial Crises', covers the early warning and management of crises, including the creation of a strategic food stockpile in every region, including Djibouti city, to be called on when there are shortages. Within the government, this component comes under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The second component, 'Structural Food and Nutritional Security', covers four thematic topics: growth and competitiveness, access to core services, income and employment opportunities for the poor, and governance and capacity-building. It addresses the main causes of food insecurity in Djibouti, which are identified as poverty, the low level of redistribution and difficulty of access to core social services.

The component includes a three-part Plan of Action for the Primary Sector, estimated to be worth US\$98 million, for the financing of which there have been discussions in Jeddah with the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and a round table of donors is planned in Djibouti later in 2009, with FAO support. The three parts of the plan can be summed up as: the rational development of water resources; production in the crop, livestock and fisheries sub-sectors; and strengthening the design, management and monitoring capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries & Water Resources. Projects under the first heading would, among other things, develop both shallow and deep groundwaters in rural areas, as well as surface waters, while the 'production' projects would promote oasis agriculture, animal health, small ruminants, artisanal fisheries and aquaculture.

Although not part of the NFSP, there is also some discussion in Djibouti about the revival of a price stabilisation scheme, similar to one that existed previously but was abandoned under Structural Adjustment. Djibouti would also be keen on a regional emergency stockpile under United Nations management, for which it sees the port of Djibouti as an appropriate site.

An aspect of Djibouti's strategy which has attracted international attention is the series of recent agreements for access to arable land in the Sudan, Ethiopia and Malawi, to supply Djibouti with cereals and high value-added products. The first of these was for the use of land at Gedaref in the Sudan, under IDB finance. The area involved is variously described as 2,000 HA and 4,200 HA. In Ethiopia, Djibouti was granted a tract of land to grow wheat at Baaleh in Oromia region, 400 km south of Addis Ababa, to be financed by the African Development Bank. Its size is variously reported as 5,000 HA and 7,000 HA. According to one report, Djibouti was also granted 10,000 sq m of lakeside land some 45 km from Addis Ababa for the

⁷ *Programme national de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle* in French.

commercial farming of rice.⁸ Finally, Djibouti has leased some arable land in Malawi for crop production, reported in the Djibouti press to be as much as 55,000 HA.⁹ It is seen in Lilongwe as an investment in Malawi's agricultural development and a source of exports. Malawi is smaller than Djibouti's immediate neighbours, but it has better arable land and water sources to facilitate agricultural production.¹⁰

Under the food security programme, the government established the Djibouti Food Security Company¹¹ with these objectives:

- Undertake projects both in Djibouti and abroad to achieve food security and the Millennium Development Goals;
- Manage the strategic food stockpile;
- Acquire food supplies in emergencies;
- Coordinate domestic and international food aid;
- Support private sector investments to improve food security;
- Provide information for the authorities on food markets and prices;
- Advise the government on food security policy.

ETHIOPIA

Food aid has been a feature of Ethiopian life since the 1980s, providing an average of 700,000 tons annually over a period of ten years.¹² In recent years the average value of emergency food and non-food aid has been US\$350 million per year. However, there is a growing acceptance that it is not fitting to maintain indefinitely what is essentially an emergency regime. Although repeated droughts have aggravated the situation, the political instability and conflicts of the 1980s have largely passed. This has made it clear that Ethiopia suffers from chronic food insecurity, not successive bouts of transient insecurity, so policy needs to remedy the causes rather than applying successive emergency measures. This realisation has had consequences in all three areas of food security policy: agriculture, social protection and disaster risk management. Part of the outcome is a close linkage between new policies that address these three issues, as well as between the government and the donors working on them.

Bearing that in mind, the government of Ethiopia and its development partners initiated a new coalition for food security in Ethiopia in 2003 under the framework of Rural Development Policies and Strategies. The Food Security Programme, which evolved from the coalition document, started implementation in the 2003-04 year and comes to an end in December 2009. The first phase of the programme is composed of three components, namely: Productive Safety Net, Resettlement, and Other Food Security Programmes. The second phase of the programme, 2010-14, will have four components, instead of three in the first phase. There will be a Productive Safety Net Programme and a Voluntary Resettlement Programme as before while the existing Other Food Security Programmes will be replaced with a

⁸ Article from *Ethiopian Times*, Addis Ababa, reprinted in English in *De Volkskrant*, Amsterdam, August 14th, 2009, www.vkblog.nl/bericht/273580/Experts_worry_over_land_grab_by_foreigners_in_Ethiopia.

⁹ *La Nation*, Djibouti, August 26th, 2009, reproduced at <http://farmlandgrab.org/7164> (in French).

¹⁰ *Coastweek*, Mombasa, April 17th, 2009, reproduced at <http://farmlandgrab.org/2908>.

¹¹ *Société Djiboutienne de sécurité alimentaire*.

¹² The World Bank's website, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21072837-isCURL:Y-menuPK:1804110-pagePK:146736-piPK:146830-theSitePK:258644,00.html>

Household Asset Building Programme and a Complementary Community Investment component.

The four components of the second phase of the Food Security Programme are described below.

- Productive Safety Net Programme

The PSNP has been described as ‘the largest social protection program in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of South Africa’.¹³ Modelled on similar programmes in several states in India, its objectives are to provide transfers to the chronically food-insecure population in a way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and creates productive assets at the community level. Over time its beneficiaries are expected to become self-sufficient in food and so ‘graduate’ from the programme and, eventually, away from any need for assistance at all. The PSNP is funded by a group of nine donors and its total budget for 2010-14 is US\$2.26 billion while the total amount committed so far is \$1.72 billion. In 2009 the PSNP operates in 290 districts (*woredas*) in eight regions. To be eligible, a household must have faced a food gap of three months or more over the last three consecutive years before the year when the programme was designed. In 2009 the number of the PSNP beneficiaries has reached 7.5 million people: that is, nearly one-tenth of the population. The programme transfers resources (cash and food), as far as possible not as a gift but in exchange for work which will build up communal assets and so increase food security in the future. The PSNP has two components, called Public Works and Direct Support. The first is directed at households in which there is at least one able-bodied person to do physical work, which they do in exchange either for food for the household or cash to buy it. The hours of work demanded are estimated to be too little to distract from the household’s own production or other livelihood activities. It aims at creating communal assets such as reclaimed land, water harvesting, irrigation, primary schools, health clinics, supplies of drinking water, feeder roads and bridges. Chronically food-insecure households without labour, such as disabled and older people, qualify for direct support under the second component: food or cash for food without any requirement to work in exchange for it.

The PSNP was originally designed with Highland agriculturalists in mind, and its method of constructing physical assets for settled communities is not best suited for pastoralists, among whom there is also chronic insecurity. Guidelines to adapt the programme for them have been tested in 18 pilot *woredas* since 2008 and the best practice will be replicated in a larger number of them from 2010, with a view to reaching all pastoral *woredas* eventually.

- Household Asset Building Programme

Assets as well as income are now widely recognised as an important protection against poverty, and this part of the FSP aims to build them up at the household level. The programme provides the same services to households in the PSNP and those which have graduated from the PSNP but are not yet food-secure. However, in the event of capacity or resource constraints the first priority of the HABP will be those within the PSNP and those who have recently graduated from the PSNP.

Donors will finance capacity building under this component, to the extent of US\$76 million, while money for loans under it will come from the Ethiopian government. The programme will be worth 2 billion birr (US\$200 million) per year.

¹³ Gilligan *et al* (2008), p. vi.

- Complementary Community Investment

This component will provide capital-intensive community infrastructure developments, aimed at benefiting groups of food-insecure people living in selected chronically food-insecure *woredas*. Investments will focus on pastoral, semi-pastoral and moisture-stressed highland areas. The regions will define the *woredas* which are in need and best able to take advantage of such investments.

- Voluntary Resettlement Programme

The Voluntary Resettlement Programme, also known as Access to Improved Land, will extend an existing programme that aims to relieve environmental stress and population pressure in vulnerable Highland areas. Each resettled household is supposed to be allocated the rights to some fertile land and other essential agricultural requirements, and initial food rations. The settler communities should be served with clean water supplies, health posts and feeder roads. However, after the experience of forced resettlement under the Derg's government in the 1980s, the VRP is controversial and donors have been reluctant to support it, fearing the human consequences if it fails.¹⁴ The programme is therefore entirely financed by the Ethiopian government.

Other areas that are given priority in the country are Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management interventions.

Social protection (SP) attends to the consumer's side of the food security equation; as we have already observed, the PSNP is essentially a form of SP, but it operates by means which should also assist food production. Parallel with the PSNP is another SP programme called the Protection of Basic Services (PBS). This programme, which also started in 2005, supports a huge expansion of infrastructure in health and education, again based on strong donor support, replacing a previous donor system of budget support. Under the government's decentralisation policy the PBS' funds are sent directly to the *woredas*, with the aim of a close integration with the FSP's measures.

Ethiopia's approach to **Disaster Risk Management (DRM)** is also being overhauled, revising the disaster management policy that has existed since 1993. Since September 2008 the new policy has been undergoing testing under the coordination of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and it is expected to be approved in its final form by June 2010. It reorients policy towards the pre-emptive management of *risks* as revealed by vulnerability maps and an early warning system, all of it on a precise legal basis. This is in preference to the less clearly defined reactive management of a drought or food crisis only when it was already occurring.

KENYA

Kenya is known for both the quality and the variety of its agricultural exports to world markets. Kenyan coffee is the industry standard for high quality, while the country pioneered the outsourcing of tea production to small farmers and became the world's largest tea-exporting nation within 50 years of entering that market. It is also sub-Saharan Africa's leader in the development and export of vegetables, cut flowers and other horticultural products. However, Kenya is also frequently a

¹⁴ This description is drawn from Devereux and Guenther (2009), p. 12.

major food importer, to the extent of more than one-third of its supplies in 2003-04.¹⁵ Despite the evident prosperity in central Nairobi, the country is among the one-third of African countries in which the average daily intake of calories is below the generally recommended level of 2,100 Kcal.¹⁶ Its rural sector presents the paradox of the highest world standards of production in some parts and recurring drought and food shortages in others. This illustrates in acute form the well-known dilemma for an agrarian country of feeding its people while also earning sufficient foreign exchange to pay for all imports, mostly through the export of agricultural or animal products.

In Kenya the global food price shock of 2008 and the continued drought were compounded by disruption of agricultural production in the 2007-08 post-election disturbances. As was explained to the consultant at the Ministry of Agriculture, the government had five main responses to the food shortage in 2008. These were:

1. Increased imports of maize, the main staple food, with a temporary waiver of duty on private sector imports and a government import programme of 630,000 tons (7 million 90-kg bags) of white maize. The private sector has imported over 900,000 tons.
2. Actions to boost food production, including an increase in the producer price of maize, which is administered by the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB).
3. The planned increase in the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR)'s target stock level from 360,000 tons to 540,000 tons of maize by the end of the 2009-10 financial year and to 720,000 tons by the end of 2010-11. The increase in the government's producer price for the 2009 maize crop to KES 2,300 per 90-kg bag was partly in order to replenish the SGR stocks.
4. Expanded production of resilient indigenous crops such as cowpeas, pigeon peas, green grams, cassava, sweet potatoes, millet, sorghum, beans and certain varieties of maize. These 'orphan' crops have long been neglected in favour of white maize and export crops. Some of this programme is directed at the arid and semi-arid lands of the North and North-east; meanwhile in Western Kenya philanthropic support from the U.S. is assisting the multiplication of cassava. Under the National Food Security and Nutrition Policy, there is a parallel campaign to diversify eating habits away from maize.
5. The bulk import of 163,000 tons of fertiliser by the government and three parastatal organisations, and a pilot programme to provide farmers with free seeds, fertilisers and training, or else low-cost credit to pay for these, depending on the farmer's means. This will be evaluated after two years and if it is successful, there will be a general move to a 50 per cent subsidy for fertiliser.

This has been accompanied in government circles by some serious rethinking about agricultural policy and food security, resulting in a new Agricultural Sector Development Strategy. The government's aim is to transform agricultural practices from low-input subsistence agriculture to commercial, technology-driven agriculture.¹⁷ The initiatives involved were described in detail in an official paper

¹⁵ Mohamed and Zziwa (2005), p. 6.

¹⁶ Kiome (2009), p. 1. The same paper indicated that Ethiopia is also in that category, while in Eritrea and Somalia the mean availability of calories is below 1,800 Kcal, which is considered the minimum intake level.

¹⁷ Speech by President Mwai Kibaki at the 2009 Nairobi International Trade Fair, September 30th, 2009, www.statehousekenya.go.ke/speeches/kibaki/sept09/2009300901.htm.

on 'Food Security in Kenya' written in July 2009 by Dr Roman Kiome, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture. Besides the immediate policies described above, this paper specified long-term programmes to achieve sustainable food security, include water harvesting (in both dry and less dry areas of the country), the extensive rehabilitation of irrigation, and rice and potato production.

Kenya possesses a National Strategic Reserve, which was revitalised in 2001. Its purpose is to buy food when there is plenty and use it when it is scarce. Besides promoting food security, its buying and selling operations should have the effect of dampening down market price fluctuations and will provide an outlet for domestic farmers' sales in surplus years. The Strategic Reserve is overseen by the Ministry of Special Programmes within the President's Office; decisions on its use are made by a board of trustees representing various ministries and have to be endorsed by the Cabinet. The title was recently changed from Strategic Grain Reserve to Strategic Food Reserve to reflect a decision to stock various foods, including rice, beans and pulses, and not just maize. Others may be added later, such as sorghum, millet, beans, powdered milk, hay for animal feed, and perhaps some root crops if problems of perishability can be overcome. The reserves are stored and managed from day to day by the NCPB. However, they have rarely reached even the previous target of 360,000 tons of maize due to lack of funds. Despite numerous requests, the Strategic Reserve has never attracted donor funding. At the beginning of 2009 it contained 270,000 tons, mostly in maize, and in the third quarter 28,000 tons were drawn down to boost the WFP's pipeline in Kenya.

As Kiome's paper pointed out, 'Empirical evidence shows that solving the food security issue from production (Supply side) point of view, while overlooking the purchasing power (demand side) of the people, does not solve the food security problem, with regard to accessibility of sufficient food by vulnerable groups'.¹⁸ This illustrates the situation in a country which has always had strong agricultural policies, and it is the converse of the producer:consumer problem identified in Ethiopia by the FAO. In Kenya IGAD's REFORM project has identified 13 state-led programmes for social protection, which include core poverty programmes (with recently increased budgets), the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programme (see below), cash transfers under a new Hunger Safety Net, and three social insurance funds.¹⁹ A National Social Protection Steering Committee was recently formed under the leadership of the Ministry of Gender, Children & Social Development. After stakeholder consultations, a new overarching policy for SP is due to be approved by the Cabinet soon. Among its changes are likely to be an increase in the programme for orphans and vulnerable children to reach 100,000 households by 2012 and in the Hunger Safety Net Programme to cover 1.5m eventually.

Since 1996 Kenya has pursued a major Arid Lands Resources Management Project, which led in 2008 to the formation of a Ministry of Northern Kenya and Arid Lands Development. The Ministry's mandate includes the development of infrastructure, the planning of settlements, strengthening livestock marketing and related industries, water supply and irrigation, natural resource management, exploration for minerals, opening up the arid lands for tourism, human resources development and solar and wind energy. The donor project has four components: drought management, natural resources management (including conflict management), community-driven development and support for local development. The third component works through Community Development Committees to build up safety nets, for example in income generation for women and young people. The fourth

¹⁸ Kiome (2009), p. 2.

¹⁹ IGAD Secretariat (2009b), pp. 19-21.

component aims to build up the main public services for northern pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, including the pioneering of mobile schools.

SOMALIA

Besides drought and a lack of investment in agriculture, the political situation and a recent aggravation of conflict severely affect food security in Somalia. The conflict is more complicated than before, with ideological and religious differences overlaid on previous clan rivalries. Besides the impact of conflict on agriculture and pastoralism, it has been estimated that foreign fishing vessels have taken catches worth more than US\$90 million from Somalian waters, destroying local fishing people's livelihoods and causing ecological damage in the process. This is seen in government circles as the background to recent pirate activities on the Somalian side.

Meanwhile, there is a vibrant war economy and Somalians show themselves to be very enterprising, with efficient moneylenders and traders and a substantial inflow of remittances from the Somali diaspora. There is a lively informal export trade in livestock (mainly sheep and goats), with 25 million animals exported through Berbera and Bossaso in the first half of 2009, most of it going through the Yemen to Saudi Arabia. There are also informal exports of cattle to north-east Kenya. In northern Somalia, there has been a market response to higher food prices, with a switch from commercial rice imports to consuming sorghum from southern Somalia.

The government's domestic policy is very limited due to the breakdown of state power and the withdrawal of the government to Nairobi. Surrogate governments have a degree of policy control in the informally autonomous Somaliland and Puntland areas in the north. The official government is requesting assistance to formulate policies and a legal framework, which might be implemented in some places before it re-assumes full power. This would enable it to be well prepared to take over power in Somalia when the time comes. In this spirit, the Somali Support Secretariat is liaising with a working group of stakeholders to update the Agricultural Strategic Framework of 2004, which was based on these seven broad priorities for intervention:

1. An increase and diversification of agricultural production, with consideration to the environment;
2. An enabling environment for agricultural development;
3. A pluralistic agricultural knowledge transfer system;
4. Sustainable access to quality inputs, services and associated information;
5. Support for marketing systems;
6. The identification and promotion of best practices;
7. Local capacity for emergency preparedness and response.

However, the donors' response continues to focus on humanitarian and emergency relief, with only limited attention to recovery and rehabilitation. Thus, after the 300 per cent inflation in food prices in 2008, emergency relief was distributed in some maize-growing areas where, in the opinion of some specialists, food-for-work programmes to provide irrigation might have been more useful in the long run.

There also suggestions that, at least in some places, some aid-related work has itself become an important source of livelihoods, displacing former agricultural and pastoral livelihoods. In one area it was reported that, prior to 15 years of continuous emergency interventions, over 80 per cent of poor households' incomes derived from their own livestock and crops; but now, at least half of their own food sources have been replaced by food aid and 40 to 50 per cent of a normal year's income is replaced by aid-related activities, such as assisting deliveries. As the

price of food aid available in the markets has fallen below farmgate prices, farmers are discouraged from cultivating the land. However, these claims are disputed by leading donors.

Within Somalia the aid donors' policies have a certain default position for food policy, although the donors too do not possess political or military control and they have to negotiate their way very carefully around the various internal forces. The UN Country Team has requested policy coherence papers, and groups of specialists are working on specific areas. Livelihoods is in the hands of the UNDP, the ILO and the Food Security & Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), an FAO project for Somalia.

THE SUDAN

Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 the ten states of Southern Sudan have been administered autonomously. However, although their food systems differ from the rest of the country for geographical reasons, this consultant only visited Khartoum during his tour and he gathered information from government and other sources there. In general, the following observations therefore do not apply to the Southern Sudan.

The Sudan's economic background is different from other countries in the region because of the recent growth in oil exports. In consequence, foreign exchange imposes less of a constraint on imports, providing the country with more policy options for food and the rural sector. It also reduces the pressure to grow cash crops for export. On the other hand, the value of oil exports has pushed the Sudanese pound's foreign exchange value up, which creates competitive pressures for other sectors, including agriculture and livestock, both on export markets and in relation to imported produce. This phenomenon, called 'Dutch disease', is well-known in situations where a major resource such as oil is exploited in a country for the first time. It even affects the operation of food aid, as we shall see.

Fundamental to the Sudan's food status is the history of conflict, both in the south and more recently in the Darfur region of the west. Besides the displacement of people, and those people's frequent confinement in IDP camps, conflict disrupts agricultural production and supply routes as well as pastoralists' migration patterns. The government has for many years virtually run a war economy and looked on domestic policies through that lens. As frequently happens in such situations, the Sudan looks for self-sufficiency in food, which means in particular an emphasis on the production of wheat, an increasingly important staple crop, especially in urban areas. Like Dutch disease, this should be no cause for surprise: the first systematic policies for food security were made in Western Europe after supply disruptions in the Second World War. The fear of a loss of supplies, perhaps for political reasons when the Sudan faces economic sanctions from one quarter, is addressed squarely in this comment in the report which developed the government's new agricultural strategy:

'Wheat consumption has increased to about two million tons in 2005 valued at 370 million dollars. This is a disturbing situation because these imports are from some limited countries from which steady flow of trade can not be ensured, thus subjecting the population to greater risks of disorderly supply. It is, therefore, necessary that the local wheat production be given high priority.'²⁰

²⁰ High Advisory Committee (2006), p. 61.

That report of 2006, called 'The Green Mobilisation', led in 2008 to the launch of a four-year Agricultural Revival Programme. The Programme document's opening paragraph sets the government's thinking in a wider regional context, arguing that the country's 'huge and diverse agricultural resource potentials ... are envisaged, not only to meet the domestic requirements for food security, employment and foreign exchange earnings but also to enable the Sudan to offer significant contributions to regional and international trade and food security.'²¹ The Programme specifies a four-year action plan from 2008-11 with nine sub-programmes to achieve this goal:

1. Infrastructure (water harvesting, irrigation and water resources, agricultural roads and bridges);
2. Capacity building;
3. Support services;
4. Information and informatics;
5. Food security, poverty reduction and rural development;
6. Marketing and export;
7. Development and modernisation of agricultural systems;
8. Protection and development of natural resources;
9. Commodity Development Council.

The total cost of this broad programme over four years was estimated at 4.8 billion Sudanese pounds (US\$2 billion), the two costliest sub-programmes being Infrastructure (2.2 billion pounds or \$924 million) and Food Security (1.4 billion pounds or \$588 million). In the first year more than half of the Food Security component was budgeted for a National Wheat Programme to be run by the Ministry of Agriculture & Forests in just three states (Northern, Nile and White Nile).

The Agricultural Revival Programme has been criticised as being too expensive and ambitious, and for having failed to achieve much so far. Another criticism lies in its support for existing irrigated and mechanised agriculture, which largely benefits urban people as the Wheat Programme does, rather than the traditional rainfed agriculture and pastoral livelihoods which serve the country's poorest people in rural areas.

For its food emergencies, the Sudan is well provided for in international aid; indeed, the WFP devotes a whole regional office to that country alone, with three units covering Darfur, the South and the rest of the country (Centre and East) respectively. Outside Darfur and the South, national and international efforts are coordinated by the Humanitarian Aid Commission at the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs in Khartoum. The HAC established joint work plans with donors in 2003, leading to a gradual shift from the 'relief' mode to early warnings and recovery, and from free food to giving food for work, seeds or other forms of exchange.

However, there are complaints in Khartoum about the volume of aid in kind that comes into the country. The overall scale of assistance nationally has recently been \$600 million to \$800 million annually, and the volume of food aid needs per year has quadrupled from 155,000 tons in 2002 to 645,000 tons in 2009. This is mainly because of the Darfur programme, which is much the largest. In 2004-05 the government persuaded the WFP to purchase sorghum within the Sudan for the Darfur programme and these purchases rose to 150,000 tons in 2007. However, this has been cut back since then, in large part because domestic prices rose above international prices, which put extra pressure on the WFP's budget and the volume of aid it can provide.

²¹ Republic of Sudan (2008), p. 34.

That illustrates the Dutch disease effect deriving from oil exploitation. Another illustration is found in pressure on agriculture and livestock exports, as according to one source the price per head of sheep was reported at SP400 in Omdurman, near Khartoum, but only SP250 on the export market in Saudi Arabia. A government body which has to contend with price changes is the Strategic Reserve Corporation, a semi-autonomous organisation which started work under the Ministry of Finance in 2001. Its purpose is to hold food stocks, mainly of cereals (sorghum, wheat and millet), which it can release in the case of shortage or purchase from farmers and hold in store when there is a glut. Like its counterpart in Kenya, its aims extend to price stabilisation as well as emergency needs. Decisions on purchases and distribution are made by the Ministry of Finance. The SRC has a formal target of holding 600,000 tons in store and annual purchases of 200,000 tons (rolled over every two years in the case of sorghum), but this has been achieved only once, for reasons of finance and availability. In September 2009 only 60,000 tons of sorghum and 250,000 tons of imported wheat were held in store while the year's purchases so far had only come to 40,000 tons. Some 40,000 tons of cereals were distributed in the year so far.

In the government circles met by this consultant in Khartoum, there was some interest in the idea of regional food reserves as well as intra-African food trade. As one senior official put it, food security cannot be controlled in one state alone: you need to use trade, since the problems faced in neighbouring countries overlap into the Sudan. He argued that this has to be approached regionally, with risk mapping and forecasts also done both regionally and sub-regionally for example. Weather forecasting for early warning systems is already done regionally from the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC), based at Kenya's Meteorological Office in Nairobi.

UGANDA

Since 2001, the Ugandan government has pursued a 16-year Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), which is part of the country's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP - itself a model for the World Bank's system of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). As such, it followed wide consultations around the country and part of the aim was to create a coherent policy structure rather than a series of separate projects. It specified seven priority areas for either public or private action:

1. Research and technology development;
2. Creating a National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) to assist farmers;
3. Agricultural education;
4. Improving access to rural finance;
5. Agro-processing and marketing;
6. Sustainable natural resource utilisation and management; and
7. Physical infrastructure.

At the time of writing a reassessment of the PMA was under way, and in particular its NAADS component. The second of the PMA's four objectives is to 'improve household food security through the market', but its achievements are widely considered to be disappointing. It has been argued that the seven-point programme required the coordination of several government ministries and turned out to be too complicated. The reassessment would be in line with the Prime Minister's reported statement in October 2009 that the PEAP as a whole had largely failed to lift Ugandans out of poverty.²²

²² *Daily Monitor*, Kampala, October 2nd, 2009.

The reassessment has not yet reached a conclusion, but it was apparent from one report that one of the options was to wind up the PMA half-way through its allotted time, in favour of working with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) instead. The reported aim was to streamline national activities with regional ones.²³ It is not clear just what this means in practice, but CAADP is part of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and it operates through regional associations, in this case the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Every IGAD member state except Somalia is in COMESA. CAADP has four policy 'pillars', with Pillar III officially defined as 'Increasing food supply, reducing hunger and improving responses to food emergency crises', and more succinctly as the Framework for African Food Security (FAFS). Pillar III's objectives are:

- Improved risk management;
- Increased supply of affordable commodities through increased production and improved market linkages;
- Increased economic opportunities for the vulnerable;
- Increased quality of diets through diversification of food among the target groups.

Uganda has ambitious plans for social protection. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development is piloting the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) cash transfer scheme, which aims after five years to provide regular cash transfers to the families of 500,000 vulnerable people who live in chronic poverty. The government also includes the following in a list of social and cash transfer programmes:

- Universal primary education;
- Abolition of fees for health services;
- Community led HIV/AIDS Initiative;
- Northern Uganda Social Action Fund;
- Voucher for Inputs Scheme;
- Uganda National Pensions Scheme;
- The National Social Security Fund.

The government has ambitions to provide universal health insurance, but it is taking time to realise them. In 2007 it drafted a National Health Insurance Bill which would enrol all people in formal employment for compulsory monetary contributions for health care. The scheme would start with the civil service and the formal private sector before being rolled out to other sectors. However, the government met scepticism about the costings and resistance from some trade unions, and the proposal is still being reconsidered.

²³ *The East African*, Nairobi, October 19th, 2009, 'Uganda: Grand Farmers Plan Uprooted Prematurely', <http://allafrica.com/stories/200910210456.html>.

5. Synthesis of policy measures in the IGAD region

There has recently been a reappraisal of various aspects of food security policy in much of the IGAD region. There are several reasons why this is happening now. Most of the region, especially the lowland pastoral areas closest to the Horn of Africa, have suffered from three years of insufficient rains, coinciding with the food price shock of 2007-08 and a continuation of conflicts and the refugee and internal displacement problems that arise from them. However, the process of reappraisal started before the drought and the price increases occurred. In the Sudan, the Agricultural Revival Programme was based on the recommendations of the *Green Mobilisation* report, which was published in 2006, while Ethiopia's new Food Security Programme began in 2005. In Ethiopia more than anywhere, the change in policy arose from a recognition of the different needs of those facing chronic and transitory food insecurity, in particular a realisation that for chronic insecurity the long-term causes must be addressed rather than repeatedly offering emergency assistance.

The dilemmas of food security policy

A series of tensions which affect food security policies are coming to the fore. The FAO's recent study of Ethiopia distinguished support for consumers (by means of food aid, asset building and other forms of social protection) from assistance to producers in high-potential areas to grow more food. This is because there are two sides to the food security coin: enough food must be *available* from producers but everybody needs *access* to it as well. The issue then arises of why certain members of society do not have adequate access to food, and how to ensure that they get it.

A variant of this opposition is between the humanitarian approach, assisting those who need food in an emergency, and the development approach, which tries to make sure that there is enough food to prevent hunger anyway. This is also the tension between the short-term and long-term approaches, related to transitory (short-term) and chronic (long-term) food insecurity. The humanitarian approach addresses transitory problems, but where they are chronic, development work is necessary.

There is also an old question whether food security implies food self-sufficiency or not. There are understandable fears about any reliance on imports for staple foods. Similar fears are felt by many people in developed countries. The motive is most clearly understood in the Sudanese government's reasoning about wheat imports: a sense of vulnerability born of its own recent experience of economic sanctions. This attitude depends to some extent on the wealth and the balance of payments of the country. However, even the UK (which, as an imperial country, was relaxed about food imports after it removed import duties in 1846) nevertheless pursued a determined policy to increase domestic farm production after suffering shortages during the Second World War. President George W. Bush also made the case bluntly on behalf of the United States:

Can you imagine a country that was unable to grow enough food to feed the people? It would be a nation that would be subject to international pressure. It would be a nation at risk. And so when we're talking about American agriculture, we're really talking about a national security issue.²⁴

²⁴ White House (2001).

Wider issues of diplomatic and even military security come into this issue. Weak, dependent states are more likely to be sensitive about it. A danger is also seen in using scarce foreign exchange to 'finance the development of agriculture in other countries', as a Russian commentator wrote of the USSR's huge and expensive imports of grain in the 25 years before that state collapsed.²⁵ We will return to this question, and the beneficial role that cross-border trade can play within the region, later in this chapter.

Protracted crises

Many of the problems in the region are 'protracted' crises. In another recent paper the FAO pointed out that such crises 'continue to draw the vast majority of humanitarian aid. Since 1997, of the US\$39.7 billion requested through the consolidated appeal process (CAP), US\$36.5 billion (91% of the total) went to appeals for complex emergencies.'²⁶ The Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia in particular all declared food emergencies in at least 15 of the years between 1986 and 2005.²⁷ The FAO paper goes on:

'Structural factors - such as failed institutions and conflicts over land and resources - are at the root of most protracted crises. They also play an important role in further fuelling crises... [C]ase studies show food insecurity to be on the whole a manifestation of social and political configuration. Yet, politico-economic analysis was, in most cases, limited and had little impact on policy process.'²⁸

The paper suggests that in such protracted cases, the best answer is a complex combination of humanitarian and development responses. In this region there have been international conflicts and internal ones between population groups, sometimes setting those with settled ways of life (including ruling groups) against nomads. There are also local conflicts between pastoral groups over access to land and water. In East Africa, and specifically in Somalia and the Sudan, conflict leading to war is one of the major causes of food insecurity, causing displacements and human misery. This points firmly to conflict resolution as a major element in achieving sustainable food security.

However, it is not sure to what extent conflict lies at the very origin of food insecurity and to what extent it is a consequence of the pressures of poverty and food insecurity; the two phenomena can feed off each other. The situation in East Africa is sharpened by population growth, climate change and water scarcity. It is made worse where settled people take over traditional grazing land or migration routes to cultivate the land, or where bigger conflicts obstruct migration routes.

There are initiatives for pastoralists, but these are slower to develop although their way of life is inherently more fragile than that of agriculturalists, and in recent years they have faced some of the worst food problems (as in Kenya now). The IGAD region has the largest number of livestock in Africa and the sector contributes some US\$10 billion to GDP, yet it is often forgotten when it comes to government expenditure. Much of the thinking on food security developed from problems with rainfed agriculture, such as Ethiopia's Highland famines in the 1970s and 1980s. Long-term responses that enable pastoralists to maintain their way of life have been slower to appear. However, Kenya's Arid Lands project is a longstanding

²⁵ Volkogonov (1995), p. 339.

²⁶ FAO (2008), p. 1.

²⁷ Alinovi *et al* (2007), pp. 2-3.

²⁸ FAO (2008), pp. 2 and 4.

example of such a response, including the mixture of humanitarian and development responses that the FAO advocated. Some earlier efforts in the region tried to make pastoralists turn to sedentary agriculture. In Ethiopia there are attempts now to provide irrigated land in arid zones for arable purposes, including the production of rice.

The market-based approach

The food price crisis pointed to an impasse in the free-market approach to agriculture and food. It had been argued that as long as export earnings are sufficient, a country can rely on world markets to supply it with food. This led to the rundown of internal food reserves and price stabilisation measures and of government support (and spending) for agriculture itself. Because of all this, many authorities were unprepared for the 2007-08 price shock.

In the long run the export-based approach did not work. When measured over a sufficiently long period, the prices of the most important agricultural export commodities of developing countries fell sharply in comparison with other major products in world trade. Thus, when set against the prices of manufactured exports, world coffee prices fell by 63 per cent from the late 1970s commodity price boom until the one which ended in 2008; cocoa by 65 per cent; and cotton by 57 per cent. Over the same period the prices of maize, wheat and rice fell by 25 per cent, 19 per cent and 45 per cent respectively in the same terms, but oil prices increased in comparison with manufactured goods by 59 per cent and phosphate rock (from which phosphate fertilisers are made) by 46 per cent.²⁹ Trying to maximise such export revenues did not resolve the developing countries' problem of commodity dependency but actually ended up doubling it. Domestic food production and markets were ignored, and food imports built up; and so, having been an issue on the export side of trade only, the notorious volatility of commodity markets, and the economic vulnerability arising from it, became an issue on the import side too, affecting the supply of staple foods, the most important commodities of all. This market-based approach to food security was evangelised in some circles in the 1990s but it lost credibility in the food price crisis. That fact, reflected in the continuation of chronic food insecurity in all countries of the region, explains more than anything else why new approaches to food security are being sought so busily now.

Agricultural markets have never functioned well, they are not reliable for farmers, any more than the weather is, and frequently they require official intervention to ensure that benefits from them return to where they are most needed. A failure to cope with the requirements of low-input, semi-subsistence farming is visible in the reported abandonment of Uganda's market-based Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture. The need for a major change in approach appeared with the global crisis of 2007-08, and specifically the food price shock, after which the fundamental question of food security had to be readdressed.

Underlying all of this are serious agricultural, environmental and demographic changes faced by the region: declining yields in many places, due to soil depletion, itself often caused by a trend towards monoculture; population pressure on natural resources; and the diminution of water resources and less regular weather patterns due to climate change. Besides global influences, Dr Kiome at Kenya's Ministry of Agriculture identified ten domestic challenges to food security:

²⁹ Calculations by the consultant. A slightly earlier set of these calculations can be found in Lines (2008), Table 3, p. 40.

- The shortening of drought cycles to every two to three years instead of five to seven years in the past;
- Population pressure in high-potential areas for agriculture;
- Continued over-reliance on rainfed agriculture;
- Limited agro-processing/value addition;
- Inefficient marketing systems;
- Losses due to pests and diseases, and poor post-harvest handling;
- The high costs of inputs such as fertiliser, seeds and fuel;
- Poor rural infrastructure such as roads and railway, energy and storage;
- Limited access to affordable credit; and
- Underfunding and underinvestment in the agriculture sector.³⁰

All of these factors apply as much to any country in the region as to Kenya.

Regional cooperation and trade

Food security solutions take various forms. A popular one for many countries in recent years has been to lease land in other countries to grow crops exclusively for the leaseholding country. This is a new version of ‘cash crops’, not very different in character from colonial or corporate plantations, except that it usually involves cereals or other annual arable crops rather than tree crops like bananas, rubber or oil palm. One can readily understand the need of a food-importing country like Djibouti for access to some food supplies under its own control, even if they are in another country. But problems can then arise for the people where the land is allocated, depending on the way it is done. It has frequently been observed that a major problem with the ‘land grabs’ of recent years lies in the unfavourable terms for the host countries on which they are usually agreed, as well as the unpleasant consequences for local people if they are pushed off the land where they live.³¹ In the import-dependent country, such a lease can ease food security problems but at the risk of exacerbating those of local people in the host country. This is all part of the painful dilemma between food production and the need for foreign exchange.

In general, there are strong arguments in favour of cross-border trade in food and agriculture, not just for the sake of food security but as a way to stimulate closer economic integration and development in the region. Besides the commodity price problem, poor African countries face many other obstacles to successful trade on world markets. It is in principle easier, and surely better, to build up trade with one’s neighbours. The supply lines are shorter, transport costs should be less, there is no technology gap to cross, and there are few of the issues of food safety and phytosanitary regulations which make the demanding legal and commercial standards required by rich countries so hard to meet. One might reflect on the European Union’s success since it was founded in 1957, as it was based on building up trade within one region between countries which were at much the same level of development.

This is the opposite of the lesson made by orthodox trade theory, according to which a country’s ‘comparative advantage’ should make it trade with other countries that are complementary to it. That is not necessarily borne out by all the facts. The theory was invented by David Ricardo, a Manchester economist, nearly 200 years ago, and it is still illustrated by an example that he himself used: English manufactured cotton (then at the cutting edge of the new industrial

³⁰ Kiome (2009), p. 4.

³¹ The consultant has no information either on the terms agreed for Djibouti’s use of agricultural land in the Sudan, Ethiopia and Malawi, or on the consequences, good or bad, for local people in those countries.

technology) in exchange for Portuguese wine (a traditional agrarian product). That undoubtedly suited the English side, but trade of this sort has been described more recently as ‘unequal exchange’ because it is between countries with unequal power and at different levels of development.

During his tour of the region, the consultant heard several expressions of a desire to expand regional cooperation. This is an alternative to excessive reliance on trade with global markets. As a matter of fact, a substantial amount of food is already traded across the borders of IGAD member countries, some of it through formal market structures, much of it not. Some of this arises from exchanges made by pastoralists who cross the frontiers, but much more is done by traders, using whatever transport may suit the journey to be made. This clearly helps people in the various countries to be fed, and it should surely be facilitated for that reason alone. Part of the reason for needing it lies in the arbitrary nature of the borders created in colonial times. Just as there are watersheds which divide waters that flow into one river (let us say the Nile) from those that flow into another (the Congo), so geography dictates where it is most logical to trade. So-called ‘market sheds’ can cross international frontiers just as easily as watersheds and rivers can.

Where farmers in one region achieve surpluses beyond regional needs (as they regularly do in north-western Ethiopia as well as much of Uganda, and from time to time in other places too), it makes more sense to enable those surpluses to feed deficit areas than to be wasted. In this way the people in deficit areas will be fed, without any need for external assistance, while the surplus farmers will earn more as they will not suffer the price collapse arising from a glut in supply. But for this to work, efficient transport and trade links are needed between the surplus and deficit areas, whether they are in the same country or not. An essential condition for all this is to ensure that enough of the final price gets back to the farmers, and does not stay in the pockets of middlemen.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the creation of a regional food reserve has been urged by some officials. Because of the degree of international cooperation it requires, it might take longer to achieve than regional trade. Perhaps plans for it should be allowed to develop gradually, as experience of national food reserves grows and mutual confidence expands via regional trade.

However, a regional system of disaster risk management is already being developed with the support of IGAD, on the grounds that risks also do not stop at the borders. In DRM, greater harmonisation has been recommended by IGAD’s REFORM programme for early warning, vulnerability analysis, hazard mapping and communication/information systems.³² Weather forecasting and other aspects of early warning are already organised regionally, by IGAD (under ICPAC) and USAID respectively.

Food security policies

Rural policies have been dominated since the 1980s by national macro-economic concerns, with the perceived need to promote exports in order to balance international payments and finance foreign debts. These considerations displaced a more fundamental concern, born in the 1970s, to put people’s basic needs first. The pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals over the last ten years or so moved the targets somewhat, but without substantially altering the framework. The reconsideration of food security policy is part of a wider reappraisal of the desired balance between states and markets, and between local, regional and

³² IGAD Secretariat (2009a), p. 15.

global economic arrangements. Since the food price shock of 2007-08, this reappraisal has focused on five areas of policy that affect food security.

Firstly, there is renewed interest in food reserves, to provide some cushion against future shocks of that sort as well as the conflict- and disaster-related shocks that most of this report discusses. That interest has been growing for nearly ten years, but the cereal price increases gave it a fresh impetus.

Part of the thinking here favours the creation of a regional reserve, probably under IGAD's auspices. And this reflects the second main area of reappraisal, which is the role of regional cooperation for food security. An important part of this lies in the facilitation and expansion of cross-border trade within the region, and practical questions of how to achieve it.

Thirdly, there is a focus on revitalising food production. This ties in with a reinvigorated preference for domestic supplies over the continuous supply of food aid, going back as food aid does in Karamoja's case to one year after Uganda's independence. There is no consensus on the best ways stimulate food production, but the ideas include improving farmers' access to fertilisers and seeds, improving those seeds themselves and, in some quarters, a greater reliance on the region's traditional sources of food, resilient as they naturally are to the harsh local conditions.

If the availability of food is thereby to be increased, access to it must also be made easier, especially in poorer regions and poorer sections of each community. This leads to the fourth focus of concern, the expansion and improvement of social protection policies, and better coordination between them.

The final focus, but by no means the least of them, is on the more systematic management of the risks of disaster. This includes the development of better early warning systems and attempts to bring them more fully under national or regional control.

6. Prioritised food security opportunities for the IGAD region

Substantial progress has been made with new policies in the region, but further possibilities for improvement remain in all aspects of food security. This includes opportunities for regional cooperation and for countries to learn from each other.

This consultant concluded a recent book with six recommended policy lines for African agriculture:

1. Restore governments' power to determine their own policies;
2. End any requirement for export orientation;
3. Restore international prices for agricultural products;
4. Restore the balance of power along international supply chains;
5. Support domestic agriculture and the production of staple foods;
6. Promote domestic and regional trade, especially in staple foods.³³

Much of the book was about the problems posed by export commodities, and items 3 and 4 on this list are of less importance for food security. But recommendations 1, 2, 5 and 6 are highly relevant and the thinking behind them underlies this report too. From that point of view, this chapter identifies a series of further opportunities to promote food security in the IGAD region. They arise from the following logical sequence of requirements to ensure food security, starting with the production of food and ending with what to do in case it goes wrong:

1. Build up food production;
2. Facilitate the distribution and commercial exchange of food between surplus and deficit areas within each country and across the IGAD region;
3. Strengthen vulnerable people with a broad range of social protection measures; and
4. Provide effective disaster risk management as a necessary failsafe device.

This sequence places food aid late on the list rather than near the top. Offering food aid alone can inhibit long-term responses by creating dependency, either as a source of food in itself or as an alternative source of income and livelihoods when aid is distributed. Food aid also competes with locally produced foods, thereby reducing their prices and, in the long run, their production. But it still needs to be available, under appropriate safeguards for its proper use.

Arising from this set of four policy goals, five types of policy will now be described.

1. Develop domestic and cross-border trade

There is a major role for expanded trade both within each country and between countries. The people of the IGAD countries are very interdependent and would be greatly assisted by the free movement of food from surplus to deficit areas. This would also advance wider economic development. Besides meeting food deficits, it would enable farmers in surplus areas to benefit more easily when their crops are abundant by achieving higher prices. This would improve their own food security and enable them to strengthen their asset base and invest in more productive agriculture for the future. The case for this has found explicit support in Kenya, where Romano Kiome's recent paper on food security used these words: 'The Government will pursue an open Regional Cross Border Marketing Policy to tap

³³ Lines (2008), pp. 144-47.

on the Regional diversity in food types, supply and varying harvest seasons.’³⁴ This deserves a positive response from Kenya’s neighbours.

Action to make this happen is required in three areas in particular:

- Border measures. Although import duties for the rest of the world have been sharply reduced, for imports from neighbouring countries they often remain high. This is the opposite of what is normally required to facilitate regional trade: a common external tariff (sometimes at quite high rates) for trade with countries outside a regional bloc, while eliminating tariffs between its member states. Other constraints at the borders, such as delays and excessive paperwork, will have to be remedied too.
- Harmonisation. Rules and regulations applying to commerce in foodstuffs, and to other related matters such as commercial vehicles, will have to be made compatible (‘harmonised’) throughout the countries of the region.
- Transport and other infrastructure. Continued improvements will be required in roads and other means of communication, both to transport food to and between rural areas of each country, and to improve links across the borders.

Several people interviewed by the consultant pointed out that, from the farmer’s point of view, there is no essential difference between exports to a neighbouring country and exports to the global market. However, from the national point of view they are different because of the character of world commodity markets. It is important to get the balance right where exports to global markets are concerned. It does not help any producing country if too much produce is consistently placed on a market by too many producers, and the price collapses as a result. It is worth looking for other ways to improve the balance of trade. An example might be collaboration among high-premium ‘origins’ on the coffee market, which include Kenya and Ethiopia, in order to jointly manage supplies and thereby achieve higher prices at their end of the coffee market. The management of supplies implies a reduction in production, which would also release a certain amount of land to grow more food. It should be noted that the African Group at the WTO has secured agreement that collaborative supply management measures of this sort will be permitted under the Doha Round.³⁵

2. Expand government expenditure on agriculture in line with the Maputo Declaration

The African Union’s members agreed at their Maputo Summit in 2003 to ‘revitalize the agricultural sector including livestock, forestry and fisheries ... adopt sound policies for agricultural and rural development’ and allocate ‘at least 10% of national budgetary resources for their implementation within five years.’³⁶ This section proposes some priorities for the use of that extra expenditure.

- i) The region should make conscious attempts to return to traditional crops and traditional knowledge, using its own resources to develop them. The range of crops is wide and includes sorghum, millet, teff, *matoke* bananas, cassava, yams, sweet potatoes and numerous pulses. These crops developed to grow

³⁴ Kiome (2009), pp. 24-25.

³⁵ Based on WTO (2006), an African Group position submitted in June 2006.

³⁶ Assembly of the African Union, Maputo, July 10th-12th, 2003, ‘Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa’, para. 2, www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Decisions_Declarations/Assembly_final/Assembly_DECLARATIONS_-_Maputo_-_FINAL5_08-08-03.pdf.

in the region and they are what the region's farmers know and understand the best. They are more resilient, for example to drought. Several examples of this can be found in this year's data. Teff planting in Ethiopia and sorghum supplies in Djibouti were closer to normal than non-indigenous crops like wheat, barley, flax and maize. In the Southern Sudan, a crop assessment in August estimated that the sorghum crop could reduce by 30-40 per cent but maize by 50-60 per cent.³⁷ In the Sudan, wheat has the highest yields of the leading crops and millet the lowest (with sorghum somewhere between them), but millet *production* volumes are the most stable and wheat the least.³⁸

The FAO's definition of food security refers to food that meets people's 'dietary needs and food preferences'. The main staple food varies from country to country and even within countries. However, in the Sudan sorghum accounts for 78 per cent of cereals grown, and wheat only 9 per cent. In Uganda, despite its strong regional variations, the most frequently eaten staple food at all levels of wealth, in eight out of 12 livelihood activity groups and in five of the 11 regions, is cassava.³⁹ Regional cooperation to encourage both the production and consumption of these indigenous crops, as well as their seed development, could yield the best results. As we saw in Chapter 5, Kenya is already pursuing such a campaign.

- ii) All appropriate measures should be taken to improve the use and conservation of water, including irrigation, terracing and water harvesting.
- iii) Improving on-farm storage would greatly reduce post-harvest losses, which are estimated at 15 to 25 per cent of production - similar to the region's production shortfall. Surer and more rapid results can be gained from investing in production-saving technologies than production-enhancing technologies.
- iv) Many people now advocate subsidies for fertilisers, based on a successful policy in Malawi. Increased fertiliser use would increase yields. However, some caution is due in view of the very sharp long-term increase in real fertiliser prices (referred to in the previous chapter) and the evidence of soil degradation and human health complications in India after several decades of heavy fertiliser use with the Green Revolution.
- v) Local rural services, especially agricultural extension, have been neglected and should be restored. In doing so, two major issues need to be borne in mind. The first is the importance of women in farm work in much of the region; to be effective, much of the extension needs to be directed at women members of farming households. Secondly, in many places services for pastoralists, for example veterinary services, have fallen away even more severely and their revival deserves priority.
- vi) Seed multiplication should be promoted, probably with subsidies for farmers and companies that engage in it, especially with traditional crops. Crop research should concentrate on indigenous crops, which are naturally adapted to local environments through the process of evolution. The international crop research system can claim major achievements in increasing crop yields over a long period, but it has concentrated on a handful of internationally traded crops, especially wheat, rice and maize. Meanwhile the yields of East African indigenous crops have fallen far behind them. The priority in seed

³⁷ See FEWSNET (2009a), p. 4; (2009b), p. 3; and (2009c), p. 5, respectively.

³⁸ SIFSIA-N/FAO (2008), p. 7.

³⁹ WFP (2009), Table 11, p. 54.

development should be to increase the *yields* of these naturally resilient crops, rather than the *resilience* of imported staples, as many elsewhere have advocated. Good work of this sort has already been done on cassava by the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, helping to promote a widespread increase in cassava production.⁴⁰

Regional breed development for livestock might also be considered.

- vii) Special emphasis should also be given to the development of formal seed sectors.
- viii) Promote multi-cropping. An accompanying crop of cassava can provide relief when for example maize fails. It will provide farmers with extra income if it, or more likely the maize or other more easily marketed crop, is sold into a deficit area. This reflects widespread traditional practice which has in places been abandoned in favour of single-crop production.

3. Build up food reserves and price support systems

National strategic food reserves should be reinforced, with committed financial support from the donors. The consultant heard suggestions from various persons that the countries should also try to help one another before they appeal to the rest of the world for help. It should be possible to set up a regional reserve to address the common problems of food security. IGAD's own Food Security Strategy proposes a study on the establishment of a sustainable regional food security emergency reserve facility,⁴¹ and the 2008 IGAD Summit resolved to 'Commence the process of establishing a regional emergency fund/facility in line with the Agreement Establishing IGAD'.⁴² A regional reserve could eventually be composed of stocks held at critical points around the region and composed of the main staple foods (e.g. sorghum, teff, millet, cassava and maize), roughly in proportion to local consumption.

In the 1950s and 1960s India had a reputation for repeated food crises, like the Horn of Africa more recently. But the Indian government now runs its own system of food aid, acquiring food for it from domestic sources. This is a powerful precedent for IGAD to follow. In other contexts, it is not unknown for concerns about foreign-supplied food aid to lead governments to reject it altogether.

Regional grain stocks, like national ones, can be used for price stabilisation as well as emergency relief. If they are managed correctly, by buying to replenish the stock when supplies are plentiful and releasing them to counter a shortage, they will have a stabilising effect on prices anyway. The reserve then helps to reduce risks as well as providing for emergencies.

Reserve stocks can be combined with minimum or 'floor' prices for farmers. When there is a good harvest and the price falls below the floor, the stock could purchase at the floor price to replenish its supply. This is a good way of setting an agreed price for its purchases and it will guarantee farmers a minimum income for crops they wish to sell. That would greatly assist those farmers' food security. For them it is farmgate prices that matter, not the retail prices that are usually taken as a guideline. For example, it is reported that during the price increases for wheat in

⁴⁰ COMESA and Michigan State University (undated), p. 4.

⁴¹ Mohamed and Zziwa (2005), Table 2, p. 45.

⁴² www.igad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=139&Itemid=92.

Khartoum in 2007-08, the producers seem to have benefited the least.⁴³ Avoiding this market outcome should be one of the main goals of intervention.

Guaranteed price floors for farmers have a proven record of success, for example in the policies adopted in Western Europe to ensure food security after the Second World War.

4. Reduce economic and social vulnerabilities

The region has the potential to produce well above its own food needs even with the current technologies. However, pervasive poverty means that a large part of the population has no 'effective' demand and cannot trigger a supply response for high-potential farming areas to produce more. Without addressing the underlying causes of widespread poverty, neither trade nor agricultural policy will eliminate chronic failures of food access. However successful agricultural policies may become, problems of food security will remain for the foreseeable future, and it will still be necessary to assist food-insecure consumers. Therefore policies for social protection and risk management and reduction need to be further developed.

We have four priority suggestions in this area.

- i) The smoothing impact of food reserve operations on prices is to be recommended, and will reduce the risks faced by rural and urban consumers. This should be based as far as possible on local purchases of food.
- ii) Security of land tenure should be ensured and sustained, including for women farmers.
- iii) Other elements of the safety net are recommended, especially food-for-work and cash-for-work aimed at preventing asset depletion at the household level and creating productive assets at community level in food-insecure rural areas.
- iv) Continue to reduce the costs to users of essential public services such as education and health. In the long run these are some of the most effective forms of social protection, for smallholder farmers and pastoralists as much as anyone else.

General economic policy could be redirected to support first and foremost the livelihoods of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and landless rural labourers, rather than further accumulation for those who already benefit from a capitalist economy. Food insecurity is above all an issue of poverty and unequal access to resources (not just to food but to income, assets and employment) in countries where resources in general are scarce. If a nation's resources are shared around more equally, food insecurity should improve of its own accord.

However, social protection is in some places fragmentary and where it does exist, each country has developed its own system. It is therefore one of the areas where the members of IGAD might have the most to learn from each other. For example, Kenya's new Hunger Safety Net Programme and Ethiopia's second-phase PSNP take rather different approaches to the same problem, and an exchange of information and visits between them might prove beneficial to both sides.

⁴³ SIFSIA-N/FAO (2008), p. 12.

5. Directly address risks of food shocks

Even chronic food insecurity is affected from year to year by changing events such as droughts and conflicts. Risk factors that arise from human agency should be reduced as far as possible, while the management of all kinds of risk should be improved. Here are some types of action that may be required:

- i) Grazing rights have been cut back in many pastoral areas, causing hardship for pastoralists and their animals and increasing the likelihood of conflicts between pastoral groups. Wherever possible these rights should be restored, allowing nomads and pastoralists to roam as freely as they did in the past.
- ii) Efforts should be redoubled to reduce conflict in the region, building on the success so far of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan and attempting comparable actions elsewhere.
- iii) The principle of Disaster Risk Management should become firmly entrenched, including increased regional cooperation to deal with shared risks. This includes the establishment of food security early warning systems at local, national and regional levels.

Specific opportunities

In every country there are particular opportunities to improve food security. Suggestions are made below for each country in turn.

Djibouti:

Food insecurity arises from the shortage of formal employment, which needs to be countered with a greater effort to build social and economic services. Reviving the food reserve and food price stabilisation should also be priorities.

Ethiopia:

Ethiopia has a strong core of 60,000 local development agents assisting agricultural extension. Now that their numbers have expanded, they need to be well supported and optimally deployed with a clear mandate and regular improvement of their knowledge and skills. They also play a crucial role in providing early warning information, and it is important for the government's new DRM policy to ensure that that information is both accurate and provided in a timely way.

Kenya:

The Strategic Food Reserve needs to be expanded and adequately financed with donor assistance. Experience with a well-run national reserve will be invaluable for any plans to establish a regional food reserve.

Somalia:

The international community needs to ensure that its assistance contributes to long-term food security and not just immediate needs. The Transitional Federal Government also deserves more support in preparing a policy basis for its eventual return to power.

The Sudan:

The choice of policy depends on how food security is defined, for example over the roles of wheat and mechanised agriculture. Household food security merits consideration on equal terms with national food security; this requires close attention to the needs of food-insecure people in rural areas, and assistance for smallholder farmers and traditional crops such as sorghum and millet.

The Strategic Reserve Corporation has an important role to play, requiring that it maintain its focus on domestic food security with full government support. The authorities should resist any temptation to be distracted by international operations, except where they are required to procure stocks for the reserve.

Grazing and roaming rights and other services, such as veterinary services, need to be assured for pastoralists, in order to make best use of the 'peace dividend' following the resolution of the country's internal conflicts.

Uganda:

The reassessment of the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture creates an opportunity for a fresh start on food security. Regional cooperation will be built into any new plans if, as reported, they are based on CAADP.

One priority for a new policy for agriculture and food security should be to restore village storage facilities, many of which were destroyed during the years of domestic conflict and have not been replaced.

Cassava should also be emphasised as much as more familiar local staples like *matoke*, millet and maize. The same goes for pulses, which are consumed even more frequently than cassava.

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Appendix 1

Terms of Reference of this study

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) REFORM programme

COUNTRIES:

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its member states; Djibouti; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Kenya; Somalia; Sudan, and; Uganda

ACTIVITY:

Inventory on Policy Measures for Food Security and Prioritization in the IGAD Region.

OBJECTIVES:

Overall objective is:

To make an inventory of existing policy measures and prioritization of interventions which enhance food security of the IGAD Region.

Specific objectives are:

1. To provide an update on the food security situation in the region, taking into account the current severe drought, the high food prices on international markets, and the recent declaration of the African Heads of State and Government on Food Security during the July 2009 AU Summit in Libya.
2. To make an inventory of policy measures in successful experiences in food security and draw implications for the IGAD Region
3. To identify key areas of food security opportunity for the IGAD Region for possible prioritization of interventions.
4. To share the results of the inventory study with the IGAD member states through a Consultative Workshop
5. To write a policy paper for appropriate IGAD governing bodies
6. To prepare a Draft Communiqué on the current food security situation indicating concrete steps and commitments countries and partners need to make to address the situation in the short and long term.

The outcome of these objectives is:

An understanding of existing and potential policy measures and prioritization to enhance Food Security of the IGAD Region which could be used as the basis for a joint IGAD statement during the World Food Security Summit in Rome, November 2009.

Appendix 2

Persons Interviewed

- Dr. Samuel Zziwa, Programme Manager, Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security, IGAD
- Hermen Ketel, Disaster Risk Management analyst, acting REFORM programme coordinator, IGAD
- Jeremy Jackson, Social Protection Analyst, REFORM programme, IGAD
- Peter Oldham, Coordinator CBT Component REFORM Programme, COMESA

In Djibouti

- Elmi Ahmed, Chef, Bureau de l'Eligibilité, Office National de l'Assistance aux Réfugiés et aux Sinistrés, Ministère de l'Intérieur
- Hassan Robleh, Chef, Service logistique, Office National de l'Assistance aux Réfugiés et aux Sinistrés, Ministère de l'Intérieur
- Abbi Ahmed, Assistant chef du personnel, Office National de l'Assistance aux Réfugiés et aux Sinistrés, Ministère de l'Intérieur
- Said Mohamed Baragoïta, Coordinator of Project Management Unit, Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage
- Said Kaïreh Youssouf, Head of Research, Planning & Resource Management, Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage
- Rachid Elmi Hersi, Country Representative, FEWSNET Djibouti
- Aline Mutagorama, Chargée du Programme, WFP

In Ethiopia

- Matewos Hunde, Director, Early Warning and Response, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
- Berhanu Woldemikael, Director, Food Security Coordination, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
- Abdirahman Ali, Food Security Analyst, FEWSNET Ethiopia
- Vincent K. Lelei, Head of Office, OCHA
- Sonali Wickrema, Head of Programme, WFP-Ethiopia
- Hans Vikoler, WFP-Ethiopia
- Christoph Wagner, Head of Economic, Trade and Social Development, EC Delegation to Ethiopia
- Carlo di Chiara, Head of Social Protection programme, EC Delegation to Ethiopia
- Takanori Satoyama, Regional Programme Officer, FAO Regional Office
- Florence Rolle, Food Security Officer, FAO Ethiopia
- Viviane Van Steirteghem, Deputy Representative, UNICEF Ethiopia
- Roger Pearson, Senior Social Policy Specialist, UNICEF Ethiopia

In the Sudan

- Hassabo Mohamed Abdelrahman, Commissioner General, Humanitarian Aid Commission, Republic of the Sudan
- Babiker Hassan, Director, Department of Food Security, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
- Eltayeb Abdel Aziz, Deputy Director-General for Planning, Strategic Reserve Corp., Ministry of Finance and National Economy

- Donato Manyon Lim, Statistics and Information Department, Strategic Reserve Corp., Ministry of Finance and National Economy
- Ab/Salam Hassen El Khatim, Strategic Reserve Corp., Ministry of Finance and National Economy
- Bahja Suliman, Strategic Reserve Corp., Ministry of Finance and National Economy
- Professor Abdella M. Ali, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Khartoum
- Mohammed Osman Hussein, Private Sector Development (export promotion), World Bank
- Maisoun Badawi, Private Sector Development (micro-finance), World Bank
- Mtendere G. Mphatso, Emergency Programme Officer, FAO
- Dr Rogerio Bonifacio, Information System and Capacity Building Specialist, EU-FAO Food Security Information for Action (SIFSIA) project at Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
- William Nall, Programme Officer, WFP
- Yvonne Forsen, Head of Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping, WFP

In Kenya

- Abach Namaa, Assistant Secretary 1, Disaster Risk Reduction, Ministry of State for Special Programmes, Office of the President, IGAD-REFORM Disaster Risk Management Focal Point
- Ibrahim A. Maalim, Deputy Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation, Ministry of State for Special Programmes
- Thomas Ngumi, Assistant Commissioner for Gender and Social Services, Ministry of Gender, Labour & Social Development
- Prof. Laban A. Ogallo, Director, IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)
- Dr Johnson Irungu, Director of Agriculture Crops Management, Ministry of Agriculture
- James Maling'a, Assistant Director of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture
- J.N. Mwambanga, Officer, Support to Local Development, Arid Lands Resource Management Project
- Guyo Golicha Iyya, Community Development Project Officer, Arid Lands Resource Management Project
- Jeanine Cooper, Head of Office, OCHA Kenya
- Pippa Bradford, Deputy Country Director, WFP
- Joao Manja, Head of Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping, WFP
- Allan Kute, Programme Officer, Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping, WFP
- Cindy Holleman, Chief Technical Advisor, Food Security & Nutrition Analysis Unit - Somalia (based in Nairobi)

In Uganda

- Daisy Eresu, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries
- Pamela Komujuni, Disaster Management Officer, Department of Disaster Management, Relief and Refugees, Prime Minister's Office
- George Beekunda, Director of Social Protection, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development
- Robert Akankwasa, Head of Department, Disaster Management, and Ken Kiggunda, Disaster Management Coordinator, Uganda Red Cross Society
- Abdirahman Meygag, Senior Programme Advisor, and Josephine Etima-Ocilaje, Programme Officer (Programme Design), East, Central & Southern Africa Regional Bureau, World Food Programme
- Andrew Mutengu, Representative, and Agnes Atyang, Deputy Representative, FEWSNET Uganda
- Hakan Tongul, Deputy Country Director, WFP Uganda

Appendix 3

Sirte Declaration on Investing in Agriculture for Economic Growth and Food Security

Adopted by the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Sirte, Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 3 July 2009

We, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union, meeting at our Thirteenth Ordinary Session in Sirte, Libya from 1 to 3 July 2009,

RECALLING within the context of the theme of the Thirteenth AU Summit, Africa's collective responsibility and commitment to advance African Agriculture with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as Africa's framework for bringing about the required institutional and policy reforms, capacity development and increased investments thereby enhanced agricultural performance with direct impact on food security and socio-economic growth, COMMENDING member states advancing in embracing CAADP implementation and the facilitating support being provided by the Commission, the NEPAD Secretariat, Regional Economic Communities and development partners,

WELCOMING the strong support to and alignment with the CAADP agenda by a growing number of bilateral and multilateral development agencies,

AWARE and CONCERNED that Hunger is a drain on economic development, a threat to global security, a barrier to human dignity and improved standard of living and therefore every effort at national, regional, continental including global level should be explored as a matter of urgency to achieve the MDG target on reducing Hunger in Africa,

ACKNOWLEDGING the importance of proactive measures and interventions to increase financing for African Agriculture and continue to improve sector policies for accelerated economic growth and attainment of the continent's food security targets,

AWARE that smallholder friendly value-chain development and access to markets and to financial services should be key elements to enhancing financial sustainability and growth of the agriculture sectors and related wealth creation,

MINDFUL of the fact that climate variability and climate change is and will be key factor to the agricultural development agenda and that it is imperative for Africa at all levels to build in productivity and resilience in agricultural systems,

NOTING that land degradation undermines food-security, increases the vulnerability of African economies to climate variability and change while, on the other hand sustainable agricultural land management approaches can raise productivity and improve Africa's resilience to climate hazards,

ACKNOWLEDGING the potential contribution to investment financing through remittances (estimated at US\$17 billion/year and could raise to as high as US\$45 billion/year), knowledge, skills and related networks that could be realized by facilitating and harnessing increased participation of Africa's diaspora in Africa's development agenda,

OBSERVING that, it is important to identify most vulnerable sections of society including women, children and the physically challenged and ensure that their special needs to participate in economic activities are embraced and supported in agricultural development strategies and investment programmes,

WELCOMING the commitment of the United Nations High Level Task Force (UN-HLTF) to joining other bilateral and multilateral agencies to strengthen CAADP and the operationalise the Global Plan of Action on Food Security (GPAFS) through CAADP in Africa,

CONSIDERING the Report of the African Union Joint Conference of Ministers responsible for Agriculture, Land and Livestock held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 22 to 24 April, 2009, and the recommendations therein endorsed by the Executive Council,

RECALLING and RELATING to past rural economy and agricultural development AU Summit decisions and declarations,

UNDERTAKE TO:

1. Meet our individual and collective responsibility and commitment to provide necessary leadership on comprehensive and Africa-wide approaches to address the root causes of poverty and hunger and accelerate progress towards achieving the growth and budgetary targets set out in the CAADP Agenda and Framework;

2. Support relevant policy and institutional reforms that will stimulate and facilitate accelerated expansion of agriculture related market opportunities by modernizing domestic and regional trading systems, removing obstacles to trans-border trades, and increasing access by smallholder farmers to inputs and the necessary commercial infrastructure and technical skills to fully integrate them into the growing value chains;

3. Develop and implement continental and regional level strategies that embrace climate change mitigation and adaptation measures as integral components in our agriculture development agendas and ensure that Africa's positions and interests are recognized in the global dialogue on climate change, starting with the forthcoming Post-Kyoto protocol negotiations;

4. Expand investments in specially targeted social protection policies and measures through predictable public support best suited for the local circumstances with special focus on most vulnerable and poor sections of society including gender programmes;

REQUEST the Commission, the NEPAD Secretariat and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to:

5. Continue to mobilise the necessary technical expertise and financial resources to support capacity development and related policy reforms to accelerate CAADP implementation in all Member States, including the signing country CAADP Compacts indicating the policy measures, investment programs, and required funding to achieve the six percent (6%) growth and ten percent (10%) budget share targets for the agricultural sector;

6. Create the tools and instruments to mobilize expertise and build capacity to support, within the CAADP Framework, agricultural and other national planning entities to:

i. Support countries build capacity in project preparation;

ii. Integrate and strengthen the use of tools to improve transparency of spending through Periodic Public Expenditure Reviews, Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, and output/results-based budgeting;

iii. reform and strengthen spending patterns, service delivery modalities, and budget execution in general to improve efficiency and effectiveness of spending in the agricultural sector.

7. Undertake major initiatives within the context of CAADP to modernize regional trading systems and promote regional integration by:

i. Establishing regional commodity exchanges to facilitate trade;

ii. Set mechanisms to monitor and enforcement application of regional trade arrangements and policies;

iii. Build regional and country level capacities for quality management and certification services;

iv. Strengthen capacity in international trade advocacy and negotiations skills.

8. Facilitate the creation of Agricultural investment and enterprise development platforms in member states and the organization Agribusiness joint venture fairs to:

i. promote the required public-private partnerships and business to business alliances to accelerate the development of competitive value chains and raise market shares in domestic, regional, and foreign export markets;

ii. foster commercial bank financing for all segments of the agribusiness value chain, in particular support the expansion of financial services to the rural areas.

9. Accelerate the emergence of cost competitive input procurement and delivery systems by:

i. fast tracking the implementation of the African Fertiliser Financing Mechanism, in particular making the required contributions to bridge the US\$ 2.5 million gap for its immediate operationalisation;

ii. scaling up ongoing regional seeds alliances to ensure broad access by smallholder farmers.

10. Facilitate increased investment in Agriculture Research and Development (ARD) and support to strengthening Africa's scientific and technical information and knowledge base, including:

i. the creation of centres of excellence for Agricultural Research and Development along the value chain of strategic agricultural commodities and animal resource products;

ii. the establishment in rural areas of vocational training and workforce development systems to upgrade smallholder farming skills, raise long term competitiveness, and encourage the youth to participate in the agriculture sector.

11. Establish a "South to South Forum for Agricultural Development in Africa" and expand engagement with the Diaspora through African Union's CIDO to unlock additional sources of technology and investment financing in African agriculture,

12. Develop an African Agricultural-based climate change mitigation and adaptation framework providing strategic guidance and tools to national and regional level initiatives along programmatic approaches on technology transfer, knowledge management and financing to scale up adoption of sustainable land and agricultural water management,

13. Rally expert input and scientific knowledge to advance the recognition and integration of carbon sequestration on agricultural landscapes and carbon financing in global climate change mitigation and adaptation measures through the Post-Kyoto negotiations and other global and regional dialogue,

14. Establish an inter-Ministerial mechanism bringing together Ministries of Agriculture, Environment, and Water to advance inter-sectoral approach in addressing the climate change agenda,

15. Facilitate analytical support to member states on integration of gender in agriculture development agenda,

URGE Member States to:

16. Recommit to the Maputo Declaration of allocating at least ten (10) percent of their annual national budgets to the agriculture sector by 2015 to articulate the important role of agriculture in national development strategies for adequate resource allocation,

17. Scale up efforts to accelerate the implementation of the CAADP agenda at the country level, in particular the organization of country roundtables and the signing of CAADP compacts,

CALL UPON International Development Partners, and regional and non-regional stakeholders:

18. To harmonise and align their investment support to African Agriculture through and along national and regional CAADP priorities, and in particular join member governments in mobilizing the necessary funding to meet the resource requirements of the priority investment programs identified in the regional and country CAADP compacts,

19. To ensure that agriculture financing initiatives are enhanced through African institutions and made accessible at country level,

REQUEST the Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat, in collaboration with the African Development Bank and other partners, to work with member states on implementation of the actions contained in this declaration and report on progress to the Ordinary Session of the Assembly in June/July 2010;

ALSO REQUESTS Regional and non-regional stakeholders to ensure that the African Development Bank and other African financial institutions have the necessary resources to deliver the requested assistance.